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In this paper we test whether German public debt has been sustainable by resorting to a test 
proposed by Bohn (1998). We apply non-parametric and semi-parametric regressions with 
time depending coefficients. This test shows that the mean of the coefficient relevant for 
sustainability has been significantly positive over the time period considered. However, there 
is a negative trend in that coefficient which seems to have ceased to decline only in the 
middle to late 1990s. Further, we find evidence that the response of the primary deficit is a U-
shaped function of the debt ratio which first declines and then rises after a certain threshold of 
the debt ratio is exceeded. 
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The issue of public debt has become a primary interest of both economists and politicians
since the 1990s in the Euro-area. Most of the OECD countries have revealed a chronic
government decit since the middle of the 1970s which has led to an increase in the debt
to GDP ratio. Looking at time series data the major cause of the increase of the public
debt in the 1970s seems to be related to the two oil crises. In the later periods, with
moderate or low growth rates and secularly rising unemployment rates in the Euro-area
countries, welfare state expenditures seem to have caused high level of public decit and
rising public debt until the middle of the 1990s.1 Yet, since then the eort to reduce
the public debt in preparation of the start of the European Monetary Union 1999 has
led to declining public decits. Only recently, in the recession 2001-2003, has the decit
increased again for some countries, in particular Germany and France.
In the academic debate on the decit and debt of the Euro-area countries it has been
argued that scal policy has been threatened to become unsustainable and that scal
policy may neither be an instrument nor eective in stabilizing the macroeconomy any
longer. This paper is concerned with formal econometric procedures that allow one to
test for sustainability of scal policy. What we are thus concerned with in this paper is
not the short run violation of the stability and growth pact of the European Monetary
Union, but rather the long-run sustainability of scal policy of the member countries. We
here study a particular country, namely Germany, yet our proposed test can be applied
to other Euro-area countries as well.
From the theoretical point of view the question of how large a private agent's debt
can become is usually answered as follows. Private households are subject to the bor-
rowing constraint which means that, given no initial debt, the expected present value
of expenditures (exclusive of interest payments) should not exceed the expected present
1In Germany, it was in particular the unication of East and West Germany that has given rise to a
debt to GDP ratio from about 44 percent in 1990 to roughly 58 percent in 1995.
1value of receipts, known as the no-Ponzi game condition. This condition implies that
a private household cannot continually borrow and pay the interest by borrowing more.
There are limits of borrowing capacity of economic agents which are usually dened by
the intertemporal budget constraints of the agents.2
For government debt this question has somewhat been left unsettled from the theoret-
ical point of view. If a government could borrow and pay the interest by borrowing more
any scal policy would be sustainable and in some suggested models this is indeed possi-
ble.3 However, that possibility is not given any longer when the economy is dynamically
ecient.4 Then, the government faces a present-value borrowing constraint stating that
the current value of public debt must equal the discounted sum of future surpluses exclu-
sive of interest payments.5 Bohn (1995) has proved that in an exchange economy with
innitely lived agents the government must always satisfy the no-Ponzi game condition.
In a series of papers, Bohn (1995, 1998) not only presents a theoretical advancement of
studying sustainability of public debt but also provides a new econometric approach to
estimate sustainability of public debt.
Empirical studies which help to clarify whether governments follow the intertemporal
budget constraint or not are indeed desirable. For the US there exist numerous studies
starting with the paper by Hamilton and Flavin (1986). In this paper they propose a
framework for analyzing whether governments can run a Ponzi scheme or not and apply
the test to US time series data. They nd sustainability of scal policy in the US. Other
papers followed which also have investigated this issue for the US and other countries, but
2A model for sustainability of private debt is developed and studied in Gr une et al. (2004).
3In overlapping generations models, for example, which are dynamically inecient a government can
borrow in order to pay interest on outstanding debt (see Diamond, 1965), i.e. it may run a Ponzi scheme.
4For an empirical study analyzing whether the US economy is dynamically ecient, see Abel et al.
(1989).
5McCallum (1984) has studied a perfect foresight version of the competitive equilibrium model of
Sidrauski (1967) and proved that permanent primary decits are not possible if the decit is dened
exclusive of interest payments.
2partly reached dierent conclusions (see e.g. Kremers, 1988, Wilcox, 1989, or Trehan and
Walsh, 1991 and Greiner and Semmler, 1999). However, these tests have been criticized
by Bohn (1995, 1998) because they make assumptions about discount rates as well as
future states of nature. The latter are dicult to estimate from a single set of observed
time series data. In a recent paper Bohn (1998) proposes a new test that is not open to
this criticism.
In our paper we extend the approach by Bohn by developing a time varying coecient
model and by applying it to German time series data. Other time series methods have
been employed to the German economy in Greiner and Semmler (1999). The latter
contribution resorted to the tests proposed by Hamilton and Falvin (1986), Trehan and
Walsh (1991) and Wilcox (1989). It turned out that the results are in part not robust
which was one motivation to apply the test proposed by Bohn (1998) in this paper. For
example, the number of lags is crucial as to the question of whether the budget surplus
is a stationary time series or not.
The remainder is organized as follows. Section 2 elaborates on some theoretical con-
siderations concerning the intertemporal budget constraint and discusses the relevant
literature. Section 3 presents our estimation results for Germany. Section 4 concludes the
paper.
2 Some theoretical considerations
Usually, it is postulated that governments too have to fulll an intertemporal budget
constraint. In economic terms, this constraint states that public (net) debt at time zero
must equal the expected value of future present-value primary surpluses. This requirement
is also often referred to as the no-Ponzi game condition. Neglecting stochastic eects and







with r the constant interest rate, B(0) public debt at time zero and S the primary surplus.6
Equivalent to equation (1) is the following equation
lim
t!1e
 rtB(t) = 0; (2)
with B(t) public debt at time t, stating that the present value of public debt converges
to zero for t ! 1:
In the economics literature numerous studies exist which explore whether (1) and
(2) hold in real economies (see for example Hamilton and Flavin, 1986, Kremers, 1988,
Wilcox, 1989, Trehan and Walsh, 1991). For example, Hamilton and Flavin (1986) suggest
to test for the presence of a bubble term in the time series of public net debt which
would indicate that a given scal policy is not sustainable. Trehan and Walsh (1991)
proposed to test whether the budget decit is stationary or to test whether the primary
budget decit and the public debt series are cointegrated and (1   L)St is stationary,
with 0   < 1 + rt: Another test, proposed by Wilcox (1989), is to test whether the
series of undiscounted debt displays an unconditional mean of zero. If this holds the
intertemporal government constraint will be fullled because the intertemporal budget
constraint requires the discounted debt to converge to zero.7
One aspect of these tests which has given rise to criticism is that they need strong
assumptions because the transversality condition involves an expectation about states in
the future that are dicult to obtain from a single set of time series data and because
assumptions about the discount rate have to be made (see e.g. Bohn, 1995, 1998).
A test procedure which circumvents that problem is to look at the time series of
the debt ratio, i.e. on the ratio of public debt to GDP. If this series is constant the
6For a derivation see e.g. Blanchard and Fischer (1989), ch. 2.
7As to these tests applied to Germany see Greiner and Semmler (1999).
4intertemporal budget constraint is fullled for dynamic ecient economies. To see this
let B=Y = c1 be the constant debt ratio, with Y the GDP and c1 a positive constant.
Inserting B=Y = c1 in (2) yields
lim
t!1c1 Y0 e
( r)t = 0; (3)
for  < r, with  > 0 the constant growth rate of GDP. The condition  < r characterizes
a dynamic ecient economy and is likely to hold in real economies. For example, in EU
countries this seems to be obvious if one compares interest rates with GDP growth rates.
But even the US, where growth rates have exceeded interest rates on safe government
bonds, is a dynamic ecient economy (for details see Abel et al., 1989). Therefore, in the
following we will limit our considerations to the case of dynamic ecient economies and
assume that the discount rate of government debt exceeds the GDP growth rate.8
However, testing for stationarity of the debt ratio is characterized by some shortcom-
ings, too. So, it is dicult to distinguish between a time series which is stationary about
a positive intercept and one that shows a trend. This holds because standard unit root
regressions have low power against autoregressive alternatives if the AR coecient is close
to one. As a consequence, the hypothesis that a given scal policy is sustainable has been
rejected too easily.
Therefore, Bohn (1998) suggests to test whether the primary decit to GDP ratio is a
positive linear function of the debt to GDP ratio. If this holds, a given scal policy will be
sustainable. The intuitive reasoning behind this argument is as follows: If a government
raises the primary surplus as the public debt ratio rises, it takes a corrective action
which stabilizes the debt ratio and makes public debt sustainable. Before we undertake
empirical tests which apply this concept we make some theoretical considerations about
the relevance of this test where we limit our considerations to deterministic economies.
8In dynamic inecient economies the government budget constraint is irrelevant because in that case
the government can play a Ponzi game.
5Assuming that the primary surplus to GDP ratio depends on a constant and linearly












with S(t) the primary surplus at time t, T(t) tax revenue at t, G(t) public spending at
t;  and  are constants which can be negative or positive.  is a systematic component
which determines how the level of the primary decit reacts to variations in GDP.  can
also be interpreted as other (constant) economic variables which aect the surplus ratio.
The coecient  can be called a reaction coecient since it gives the response of the
primary surplus ratio to an increase in the debt ratio. Inserting (4) in the dierential
equation giving the evolution of public debt the latter equation is given by
_ B(t) = rB(t) + G(t)   T(t) = (r   )B(t)   Y (t): (5)




r      

Y (0)e
 t + e
(r )t C1; (6)
with B(0) > 0 debt at time t = 0 which is assumed to be strictly positive and with C1 a











The rst term on the right hand side in (7) converges to zero in dynamic ecient
economies and the second term converges for  > 0 and diverges for  < 0: These con-
siderations show that  > 0 guarantees that the intertemporal budget constraint of the
government holds.
It must also be pointed out that in a stochastic economy dynamic eciency does not
necessarily imply that the interest rate on government debt exceeds the growth rate of
the economy, i.e.  > r may occur. This holds because with risky assets the interest
6rate on safe government bonds can be lower than the marginal product of capital. If the
stochastic economy is dynamically ecient and the growth rate exceeds the interest rate
on government bonds, a positive  is nevertheless also sucient for the intertemporal
budget constraint to be fullled if  = 0 holds which is immediately seen froom (7).
For Germany the average dierence between the growth rate of GDP and the interest
rate has been negative implying that the rst term in (7) converges to zero. In this case,
the sign of  is irrelevant. On average, the dierence between the growth rate of GDP and
the interest rate was -1.02 percent in Germany for the period from 1960-2003. Therefore,
a positive sign for  would be sucient for sustainability in Germany.
Further, with equation (4) the debt to GDP ratio evolves according to








= b(r      )   ; (8)
Solving this dierential equation we get the debt to GDP ratio b as
b(t) =

(r      )
+ e
(r  )t C2; (9)
where C2 is a constant given by C2 = b(0)   =(r      ); with b(0)  B(0)=Y (0) the
debt-GDP ratio at time t = 0:
Equation (9) shows that the debt to GDP ratio remains bounded if r       < 0
holds. This shows that a positive  does not assure boundedness of the debt-GDP ratio
although the intertemporal budget constraint of the government is fullled in this case.
Only if  is larger than the dierence between the interest rate and the GDP growth rate
the debt ratio remains bounded. These considerations demonstrate that sustainability of
public debt may be given even if the debt-GDP ratio rises over time. A situation which
seems to hold for Germany.
In the next section, we perform some empirical tests based on our theoretical con-
siderations of this section in order to get evidence about sustainability of German scal
policy.
73 Empirical Evidence for Germany
The previous section has highlighted an alternative estimation strategy to test for sus-
tainability of scal policy. We here pursue this test to Germany and empirically analyze
how the primary surplus reacts to the debt-GDP ratio in order to see whether a given
scal policy is sustainable where we consider the period from 1960-2003.
As outlined above the main idea in testing for sustainability is to estimate the following
equation
pst = bt + 
>Zt + t (10)
where pst and bt is the primary surplus and debt ratio respectively, Zt is a vector which
consists of the number 1 and of other factors related to the primary surplus and t is an
error term which is i.i.d. N(0;2).
As concerns the other variables contained in Zt, which are assumed to aect the
primary surplus, we include the real long-term interest rate (r) and a variable reecting
the business cycle (Y V AR). YVAR is calculated by applying the HP-lter on the GDP-
series. Further, in one version of (10) the social surplus ratio (Soc) is subtracted from
the primary surplus ratio and is considered as exogenous in order to catch possible eects
of transfers between the social insurance system and the government.9 In the second
equation to be estimated the social surplus ratio is included in the primary surplus ratio.
In addition, we decided that it is more reasonable to include the lagged debt ratio bt 1
instead of the instantaneous bt, although theory says that the response of the surplus on
higher debt should be immediate. We do this, because interest payments on debt and
repayment of the debt occurs at later periods.
9Soct is computed by subtracting Social Benets Paid By Government from the Social Security Con-
tributions Received By Government.
8Summarizing our discussion the equations to be estimated are as follows:
pst = 0 + bt 1 + 1Soct + 2 rt + 3Y V ARt + t (11)
ps
soc
t = 0 + bt 1 + 2rt + 3Y V ARt + t (12)
where pst is the primary surplus ratio exclusive of the social surplus and pssoc
t denotes the
primary surplus ratio including the social surplus.
As already mentioned, we estimate equation (10) both with the primary surplus ex-
clusive and inclusive of the social surplus. We do this because, on the one hand, the social
decit does not aect public debt if the decit is nanced by possible surpluses of previ-
ous periods. However, if there are no surpluses in previous periods the government has
to nance the decit which raises public debt, although not directly because public social
insurances do not borrow at the capital market. In addition, the public health insurance
in Germany is not allowed to make decits. However, if it does run decits public debt
rises but the debt has to be repaid in the next period so that the increase in debt is only
transitory. Because of this, the social decit only contributes in part to public debt or
the contribution is transitory so that estimation of (10) both inclusive and exclusive of
public debt seems to be justied.
Before we estimate equations (11)-(12) we take a look at the evolution of the public


















































Figure 1: Debt-GDP ratio and primary surplus-ratio, exclusive of social surplus (Surplus)
and inclusive of social surplus (Surplus+Soc).
As gure 1 shows the German government was confronted with high debt ratios ac-
companied with permanent primary decits at the beginning of the mid-seventies. Fur-
thermore, in gure 1 two episodes of a sharp rise in the growth rate of public debt can be
observed followed by periods with budgetary discipline and lower increasing debt ratios.
In the mid-seventies the debt ratio increases very rapidly, due to the oil shock, which also
caused a recession with the rise of the unemployment rate. This fact is highlighted in
gure 1 by the dotted line for the debt to GDP ratio and by the solid and dashed lines
for the primary surplus exclusive and inclusive of the social surplus. The second sharp
increase of the debt ratio was caused by the German unication and began in the early
nineties as the GDP growth rates slowed down.
Further, gure 1 shows there might be possible structural breaks in the time series of
the debt ratio. The rst oil price shock in 1974 is one of them. Secondly, plotting the
surplus against the debt level (cf. gure 4 below) indicates a breakpoint at a debt level of
about 40 %, i.e. in 1980 the reaction of the surplus of growing debt changes and presents
now a positive slope. At last, German unication in 1990 has lead to a sharp increase of
10public indebtedness.
The next table presents the results of the Chow breakpoint test and the F-test on
equal variances.
Year Debt Ratio Chow Test Variance-Ratio-Test
(p-value) (p-value)
1974 0.180 7.286 (0.000) 4.053 (0.017)
1980 0.311 7.896 (0.000) 2.746 (0.027)
1989 0.409 4.035 (0.004) 1.999 (0.085)
Table 1: Structual Breaks for Germany
For 1980 we get the highest Chow F-test statistic and the hypothesis of no structural
break must be rejected. The variance ratio test indicates that the variances of both
subsamples are signicantly dierent. The same holds for the breakpoint in 1974. Only
in 1989 the null for equal variances cannot be rejected at the 5% level. Summarizing our
ndings, we must conclude that there are at least more than one structural break in the
data.
These ndings suggest that the response of the primary surplus ratio to higher debt
ratios has not been constant but, instead, varied with time. Therefore, we estimate
equations (11)-(12) assuming a time dependent coecient t:
3.1 Estimating the coecient t
In this section we estimate the coecient t which may vary over time. Generally, the
regression model with l varying coecients is given by
yi = x1i1(t1i) + x2i2(t2i) + ::: + xlil(tli) + i; (13)
where we have denoted the set of n observations for the response variable Y , for the
predictor variable Xj and for the modifying variable Tj by yi, xij; and tij, respectively.
The problem in the varying coecient model (13), then, is to t the data by nding the























where the simplifying assumption a < xj1 < ::: < xjn < b can be made.  is the smoothing
parameter and the choice of that parameter plays an important role. Small values for 
reduce the variance of the t but raise the bias so that one can speak of a bias-variance
trade-o (see Hasti and Tibshirani, 1990).
One way to determine the parameter  is to resort to the Generalized Cross Validation
(GCV) criterion (see e.g. Hasti and Tibshirani, 1990, chap. 3). According to that criterion











is minimized, where S is the smoother matrix and ^ (xi) denotes the t at xi. GCV is
similar to the Ordinary Cross Validation (OCV) criterion which works as follows: The
model is tted to the data with one observation left out. Then, the squared dierence
between the missing data point and the prediction of the model for that missing observa-
tion is measured. This process is repeated for each datum and the mean square dierence
between the models (tted to all data except for one missing datum) and the missing
data is computed. This dierence is an objective which should be minimized. The idea
is that a model that is too smooth will not yield a good prediction for the observation
left out in the process of tting the model. The same holds for a model that is too wiggle
and overts the model. The dierence between OCV and GCV is that GCV replaces the
diagonal elements of the smoother matrix by its average value, trS=n, which is easier to
compute.
Assuming that the reaction parameter t depends on time equation (11) in our ap-
proach becomes
pst = 0 + (  + s(t))bt 1 + 1Soct + 2 rt + 3Y V ARt + t: (16)
12  in equation (16) gives the mean of that coecient over the whole period and s(t) gives
the deviation from that mean depending on time. Estimating (16) for Germany gives the
following results.10
Coe. Std. Error (t-stat.) Pr(> jtj)
constant -0.07 0.017 (-3.982) 3.510 4
bt 1 0.313 0.073 (4.297) 1.410 4
Soct 0.643 0.258 (2.49) 0.018
rt -0.084 0.189 (-0.447) 0.658
Y V ARt -0.073 0.165 (-0.439) 0.664




Table 2: Estimates for equation (16)
Table 2 shows that the mean of the reaction coecient   is positive and highly signif-
icant. That is, on average assuming a sustainable scal policy in Germany is supported
by the data. The interest rate and the business cycle variable Y V AR, however, are not
statistically signicant. On the other side, the social surplus has a signicantly positive
eect on the primary surplus (exclusive of the social surplus).
Further, table 2 also shows that the time varying smooth term s(t) is signicant. In
gure 2 we show the graph of the estimated s(t).
10All estimation were performed using the mgcv package in R (cf. Wood, 2001).






















Figure 2: Time varying component s(t) giving the deviation from the mean value   in
equation (16).
Figure 2 shows that the reaction coecient t = (  + s(t)) declined over time. This
means that over time the government had less scope for its spending leading the govern-
ment to put less importance on the question of sustainability of public debt. Reasons
for this may be decits in the public social insurances. So, on the one hand the gov-
ernment has to nance decits in public social insurances, on the other hand, it cannot
use possible surplus made at some times. Nevertheless, it should be noticed that t re-
mains strictly positive over the whole period. Further, it seems that the negative trend
was stopped in the mid 1990s although this statement should be made with care since
additional observations are needed to learn more about more recent periods.
When we allow for other time varying coecients the main results do not change.
Then, the qualitative outcome is basically the same as in table 2. For example, assuming
14that all coecients are time dependent we get statistically signicant eects of the debt
ratio and of the social surplus while the coecients of the interest rate and of Y V AR
are not statistically signicant. Further, the assumption of a time varying coecient t
is still statistically signicant and t becomes smaller over time as in gure 2. But the
hypothesis that other coecients are time dependent must be rejected, with the exception
of the interest rate. The result of the estimation is shown in table 3.
Coe. Std. Error (t-stat.) Pr(> jtj)
constant -0.07 0.022 (-3.207) 0.003
bt 1 0.285 0.088 (3.222) 0.003
Soct 1.257 0.412 (3.052) 0.005
rt 0.154 0.25 (0.614) 0.545
Y V ARt 0.009 0.688 (0.013) 0.99
s(t): bt 1 edf: 2.05 chi-sq.: 14.45 p-value: 0.003
s(t): Socialt edf: 1 chi-sq.: 1.114 p-value: 0.3
s(t): rt edf: 6.569 chi-sq.: 18.673 p-value: 0.025




Table 3: Estimates for equation (11) with all coecients time dependent.
When we allow for a time varying coecient t in the equation with the primary




t = 0 + (  + s(t))bt 1 + 2 rt + 3Y V ARt + t: (17)
Table 4 shows the outcome of this estimation
15Coe. Std. Error (t-stat.) Pr(> jtj)
constant -0.049 0.028 (-1.767) 0.087
bt 1 0.216 0.112 (1.923) 0.064
rt -0.323 0.258 (-1.253) 0.219
Y V ARt 0.419 0.456 (0.919) 0.365




Table 4: Estimates for equation (17).
Table 4 shows that the average of the coecient t is statistically signicant at roughly
the 7 percent signicance level. Further, the assumption that t is constant can again
clearly be rejected. The statistical signicance of the average of the coecient t rises
when we allow all coecients to be time varying as demonstrated in table 5.
Coe. Std. Error (t-stat.) Pr(> jtj)
constant -0.066 0.031 (-2.127) 0.042
bt 1 0.305 0.131 (2.324) 0.027
rt -0.232 0.288 (-0.804) 0.428
Y V ARt 3.346 2.026 (1.652) 0.11
s(t): bt 1 edf: 7.628 chi-sq.: 28.493 p-value: 0.005
s(t): rt edf: 1.921 chi-sq.: 2.936 p-value: 0.234




Table 5: Estimates for equation (11) with all coecients time dependent.
Table 5 yields slightly better results than table 4 implying that the estimation with all
coecients being time dependent reects the behaviour of German government denitely
16better. So, both R2(adj.) and the deviance explained rise while the GCV score decreases
by about 3.7 percent. The mean of the reaction coecient,  ; is positive and statistically
signicant at about the 3 percent level. The assumption of time dependence of this
coecient is also statistically signicant. The time path of the deviation of t from its
mean is shown in gure 3.11






























Figure 3: Time varying component s(t) giving the deviation from the mean value   in
equation (17).
It seems that the social surplus plays an important although not the only role in
determining the deviation of t from its mean. So up to the mid late 1970s the decit
in the social insurances relative to GDP had monotonously decreased until it became
a surplus around 1972 (cf. gure 1). This had a positive eect on t and made this
11We leave out the condence interval so that the maximum and the minimum can be better recognized.
17coecient increase since the government did not have to nance decits of the public
social insurances any longer. Since the late 1980s and, especially, with German unication
in 1990 sustainability issues seem to have become smaller leading to a sharp decline in
the reaction coecient t: Only since the mid or late 1990s t has increased again.
But, as in the estimations with the primary surplus exclusive of the social surplus, the
reaction coecient remains positive over the whole time period, except for the mid 1990s
possibly. Further, in contrast to the previous estimations, where the primary surplus
exclusive of the social surplus was the independent variable, the reaction coecient seems
to show a clear tendency to rise since the mid or late 1990s.
Overall, our estimations yield evidence that German scal policy has been sustainable
over the time period we consider. This conclusion is based on the sign of the reaction
coecient which has been strictly positive for most of the time period. However, there is
a clear negative trend in the reaction coecient up to the mid 1990s. Only in the mid
1990s this trend could be stopped.
3.2 A non-parametric estimation
In the last section we have estimated a semi-parametric model, where parameters were
present which, however, depend on time in a non-parametric way. In this section we
want to estimate a non-parametric model where we assume an additive structure. We do
this because we are interested in the question of whether the coecient  possibly is a
nonlinear function of bt 1 as suggested by gure 4 which shows the primary surplus and
the debt ratio of the previous period.
























Figure 4: Primary surplus ratio exclusive of social surplus and debt ratio.
Assuming an additive model, equation (13), then, becomes
yi = 0 + f1(x1i) + ::: + fl(xli) + i: (18)
Equivalently to (14) the problem now is to nd the function ^ f(x) with two continuous





















where again the simplifying assumption a < xj1 < ::: < xjn < b can be made and  is the
smoothing parameter and is chosen according to GCV as in the last section.
The equation to be estimated in our approach, then, becomes12
pst = 0 + s(bt 1) + f1(rt) + f2(Y V ARt) + t: (20)
12We delete the variable Soct because it is insignicant and leads to worse results in terms of the
deviance explained, R2(adj.) and the GCV score.
19Estimating (20) for Germany we get the results shown in table 6 which demonstrate
that the assumption of a nonlinear response of the primary surplus ratio to a higher debt
ratio is statistically signicant.
Coe. Std. Error (t-stat.) Pr(> jtj)
constant 0.005 0.002 (2.692) 0.011
s(bt 1) edf: 2.379 chi-sq.: 20.667 p-value: 4.210 4
f1(rt) edf: 1 chi-sq.: 7.765 p-value: 0.008




Table 6: Estimates for equation (20).
Figure 5 shows the function s(bt 1) and conrms that for small values of bt 1 the
primary surplus ratio negatively depends on bt 1 and only for values of bt 1 larger than
about 0.4 a positive relation can be observed where the response of the primary surplus
increases with higher debt ratios. This means that the German government obviously did
not pay attention to the question of sustainability of public debt as long as the debt ratio
was below a certain threshold. Only when this threshold was exceeded the government
positively reacted to higher debt ratios.























Figure 5: Response of the primary surplus as a function of the lagged debt ratio bt 1.
Taking the primary surplus ratio inclusive of the social surplus ratio the equation to
be estimated is given by
ps
soc
t = 0 + s(bt 1) + f1(rt) + f2(Y V ARt) + t: (21)
The results of this estimation are given in table 7.
21Coe. Std. Error (t-stat.) Pr(> jtj)
constant 0.001 0.002 (0.645) 0.523
s(bt 1) edf: 1 chi-sq.: 3.106 p-value: 0.086
f2(rt) edf: 1 chi-sq.: 3.686 p-value: 0.062




Table 7: Estimates for equation (21).
Table 7 shows that the assumption of a nonlinear response of the primary surplus ratio
to a higher debt ratio must be rejected because the estimated degrees of freedom (edf)
are equal to 1. Further, the statistical signicance of a constant linear response of the
primary surplus ratio to a higher debt ratio is small. But, this does not mean that the
primary surplus ratio does not react to changes in the debt ratio. All that can be said
is that linear models with constant coecients perform poor, which is also seen by the
small value of R2(adj.) among other things. But models with time varying coecients,
as shown in tables 4 and 5, yield good results and seem to better t reality.
Further, one also realizes that the business cycle variable has a relatively high statis-
tical signicance. This may be explained by the fact that the government has less scope
in controlling the primary surplus when the social surplus is included because the latter
is strongly correlated with the business cycle.
Only when the debt ratio is the sole explanatory variable this variable is statistically
signicant at roughly the 5% level. 8 gives the outcome of this estimation.
22Coe. Std. Error (t-stat.) Pr(> jtj)
constant 0.001 0.002 (0.623) 0.537




Table 8: Estimates for equation (21) with bt 1 as the only variable.
The graph obtained is qualitatively the same as the one shown in gure 5 except that
the response of the primary surplus ratio to the debt ratio becomes positive for b larger
than about 0.3. However, the estimation with b as the only variable yields a poor outcome
with an R2(adj.) of 0.152, an explained deviance of 22.1 percent and with a higher GCV
score compared to the one shown in table 7.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have developed and apply a new empirical test that allows us to study
the question of whether public debt in Germany is sustainable. In our time series study
we employ the sample period 1960-2003. Estimating a semi-parametric model with time
varying reaction coecients has revealed that the primary surplus to GDP ratio positively
reacts to higher debt ratios implying sustainability of a given path of public debt. How-
ever, we have also shown that there is a negative trend in that coecient which seems to
have ceased to decline only in the middle or late 1990s.
Assuming that the response of the primary surplus to GDP ratio is a nonlinear function
of the debt ratio and of other variables suggests that there exists a U-shaped relationship
between the primary surplus and the debt ratio. Only when the debt ratio exceeds a
certain threshold the primary surplus increases as a result of a higher debt ratio while it
declines when the debt ratio is below that threshold. This demonstrates that the German
23government seems to have paid attention to the problem of debt sustainability only for
suciently high debt ratios.
Overall, the conclusion we draw from our empirical estimations is that there is signi-
cant evidence that German scal policy has been sustainable. Primarily, this is based on
the outcome of our estimations with time varying reaction coecients. In almost all of
these estimations the reaction coecients have been signicantly positive.
However, we should also like to point out an important drawback of our conclusion.
We know that the German demographic development is characterized by an increasing
life expectancy and declining birth rates implying a large implicit public debt in the
future. Even if the retirement age is increased and the average pension is reduced this
will pose a tremendous challenge for German scal policy. Therefore, the answer of the
question whether German public debt will remain on a sustainable path in the future will
signicantly depend on how the government meets the latter challenge.
245 Appendix: Data
Source: OECD Economic Outlook Statistics and Projections
We use the Data Set corresponding to those published in the June 2003 issue of the
OECD Economic Outlook. Especially, we take the entire Data set for the Government
Account and the series for Gross Domestic Product at Market prices (GDP)
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